Using a longer time period and both NYSE-Amex and Nasdaq stocks, this paper examines short interest and stock returns in more detail than any previous study and finds that many documented patterns are not robust. While equally weighted high short interest portfolios generally underperform, value weighted portfolios do not. In addition, there is a negative correlation between market returns and short interest over our whole period. Finally, inferences from short time periods, such as 1988-1994 when the underperformance of high short interest stocks was exceptional or 1995-2002, when high short interest Nasdaq stocks did not underperform, are misleading.
Introduction
It is now widely accepted that stocks with high short interest ratios underperform the market. This is a very recent bit of conventional wisdom, based largely on the evidence in Asquith and Meulbroek's (1995) unpublished working paper for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (Amex) stocks, and Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran's (2002) article for Nasdaq stocks. Both Asquith and Meulbroek and Desai et al report negative and significant abnormal returns for firms with short interest ratios of 2.5% or more, where the short interest ratio is defined as the ratio of short interest to shares outstanding.
Both papers also report large secular increases in short interest ratios, and skewed cross-sectional distributions, with most stocks having short interest ratios of less than 0.5%, and very few firms having a ratio exceeding 10%. Prior to these papers, the conventional wisdom was that large short positions presaged positive future returns, caused by the flow demand from short sellers covering their positions. 1 The rationale for why high short interest should presage negative abnormal returns relies upon the fact that short selling stocks is costly or constrained relative to taking long positions.
There are many reasons for this, primarily regulatory constraints. If short selling is costly, the "votes" of optimistic investors carry a greater weight than those of pessimistic investors in stock valuation. Two predictions flow from these observations. First, firms with a high dispersion of opinion will be overvalued, and thus have low subsequent returns, as first discussed by Miller (1977) . Second, since short sellers will concentrate their positions in the firms that are most overvalued, firms with high short interest ratios will have low subsequent returns, as modeled by Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) . This paper shows that the new conventional wisdom regarding short interest ratios and return predictability, as well as continual increases in short interest ratios over time, is premature and incomplete. Using a longer time period for both NYSE-Amex and Nasdaq stocks and examining short interest and stock returns in more detail than any previous study, we find that the patterns are more ambiguous than the recent literature suggests. While the result that high short interest stocks underperform is generally true for equally weighted portfolios, it does not hold for value weighted portfolios. Specifically, for the period from 1976 to 2002, equally weighted (EW) portfolios of NYSE-Amex and (beginning in July 1988) Nasdaq firms with high short interest reliably underperform. These same portfolios over the same calendar time period, however, do not reliably underperform on a value weighted (VW) basis. For example, firms in the 99 th percentile of short interest ratios have monthly abnormal returns of -53 basis points (t= -2.44) on an EW basis, but only -5 basis points (t= -0.17) on a VW basis. This difference is not because highly shorted stocks are all micro-caps, however. While highly shorted stocks have a larger median equity value than the median of non-highly shorted stocks, they are disproportionately small stocks, with both micro-cap stocks and large-cap stocks underrepresented. This is true for the entire sample and for the subsamples of NYSE-Amex and Nasdaq firms.
In addition to the differences between EW and VW portfolios, over the period [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] , when data for all markets are available, there are differences between NYSE-Amex and Nasdaq firms. The abnormal returns on NYSE-Amex stocks with high short interest are more negative and more consistent across portfolios than for Nasdaq stocks.
Consistent with other studies, we find that the higher the short interest ratio, the lower is the subsequent performance. That is, firms with short interest ratios of 10% or more underperform those of 5% or 2.5%. Likewise, firms that are in the 99 th percentile of short interest underperform firms in the 95 th percentile. These are not fair comparisons, however, since these portfolios are not distinct. The 2.5% portfolio includes stocks in the 5% and 10% portfolio.
Likewise the 95 th percentile portfolio includes stocks in the 99 th percentile portfolio. This suggests that the magnitude and significance of abnormal returns for the less restrictive portfolios are driven by stocks with the highest short interest.
We examine this issue using truncated portfolios, i.e. 2.5-4.9%, 5-9.9%, and 95-98.9 th percentiles, and find that this is in fact the case. For the sample of NYSE-Amex-Nasdaq firms over the period [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] , the truncated portfolio returns are not as negative or significant as are the corresponding untruncated portfolio returns. In general, the portfolios with reliably negative abnormal returns are EW portfolios with high short interest ratios. These stocks comprise a small percentage of all firms and market capitalization. In a typical year, there are 5,500 domestic operating companies trading on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq National Market System. Only 55 of them are in the 99 th percentile, which is the portfolio with the worst performance. For the other 5,445 firms, short interest ratios have only a modest ability to predict abnormal returns.
Moreover, our results are not as significantly negative as those reported by Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) and Desai et al (2002) . Differences with Desai et al's results are due to the fact that during the period they analyze, July 1988 July -1994 , stocks with high short interest do exceptionally poorly, on both an EW and VW basis. In fact, returns to highly shorted stocks for all markets in this subperiod are the most negative of any subperiod that we examine. In other subperiods, in particular the 1995-2002 period, not covered by Asquith and Meulbroek or Desai et al, EW Nasdaq portfolios and all VW portfolios of high short interest stocks do not reliably underperform the market.
Our differences with the Asquith and Meulbroek results are not only due to the time period they examine. The differences are also attributable to different methodologies. First, they do not measure returns using a four-factor model as we and Desai et al do. Second, in the most often-cited early versions of the paper (later corrected), they calculate the abnormal return on stock i as ln(1 + r it ) -ln(1 + r mt ), where r it and r mt are the firm return and market return in month t.
This empirical procedure produces biased abnormal returns, since expected log returns depend upon both the mean and the variance of the simple returns. Since individual stock returns have a higher variance than the market return, the expected market-adjusted log return is negative in random samples, with the bias approximately equal to ½ the average unique variance. If the average variance of idiosyncratic returns is (0.3) 2 per year (30 percent squared), the bias is almost 40 basis points per month.
Taken together, this implies that the new conventional wisdom about the poor performance of stocks with high short interest is based on Nasdaq stocks for an atypical six-andone-half year sample period, and on a biased methodology that does not consider the FamaFrench risk factors for NYSE-Amex stocks. It is also based only on EW portfolios.
Our results also differ from the existing literature on other dimensions. Asquith and Meulbroek and Desai et al report that there has been a continual increase in short interest ratios over time. Lamont and Stein (2004) report that short interest ratios declined during part of the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] and that there is a large negative correlation between stock returns and short interest for the Nasdaq market. All three studies examine too short a time period to draw general conclusions. We find that short interest did not continue to rise steadily in the period subsequent We also find that the negative performance of stocks with high short interest is less persistent than Desai et al report. In most subperiods, there is a fairly rapid decay of negative abnormal performance towards zero, once short interest ratios fall. Specifically, portfolios that remove firms with high short interest as soon as the short interest ratio drops below a fixed threshold have more negative abnormal returns than those that keep a firm in the portfolio for some additional inclusion period, e.g. 12 months. Thus, to implement a strategy that is restricted to firms with a high short interest ratio, portfolio turnover must be extensive, and this would result in an implementation shortfall relative to returns that are estimated ignoring transaction costs.
Individual stocks have high short interest for a variety of reasons. Some stocks have high short interest because some investors feel they are overvalued (valuation shorts). Other stocks have high short interest because some investors feel that a convertible bond issued by the company is undervalued (arbitrage shorts). When we categorize stocks in our high short interest portfolios on the basis of whether they may be subject to convertible bond arbitrage, we find that the arbitrage short sellers do not profit as much as value-based short sellers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related literature, while Section III describes the data and the research design. Section IV presents the main empirical results, while Section V considers arbitrage versus valuation-based short selling.
Section VI outlines some implications of our results and concludes. The Appendix contains institutional details on the procedures of short selling.
II. Related Literature
Short sales restrictions were originally passed to prevent downward pressure on stock prices (Jones and Lamont (2002) ) and short sellers remain reviled today by firm managers (Lamont (2002) ). Rubinstein (2004) surveys the theoretical models on short sales and their effect on stock returns. This literature relies on both institutional restrictions on short sales and heterogeneous beliefs among investors. The modern empirical literature showing that short sales affect subsequent stock returns begins with Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) and Desai et al (2002) . Prior to these papers, empirical research did not identify a strong or consistent relationship between short interest and subsequent returns (see Figlewski (1981) , Brent, Morse and Stice (1990) , Figlewski and Webb (1993) , and Woolridge and Dickinson (1994) ). One reason for this failure is that some of these previous studies did not select their sample firms based upon the level of short interest. The relation between short interest and returns is difficult to detect using a random sample since a large percentage of firms have little or no short interest in any given month. In their study of the announcement effects of short interest, Senchek and Starks (1992) do look at levels of short interest, but their sample size is limited.
Contemporaneous research on short interest and stock returns includes Gopalan (2003) and Boehme, Danielson, and Sorescu (2002) . Gopalan examines the relation between short interest ratios and subsequent returns for a sample of NYSE and Nasdaq stocks from 1992-2000.
He finds that stocks that are likely to be short sale constrained earn lower one month ahead returns compared to unconstrained stocks. Boehme et al examine the relation between short interest and abnormal returns in the period January 1988 through July 1999 for NYSE-listed stocks and January 1993 through July 1999 for Nasdaq-listed stocks. They sort stocks into portfolios based on market capitalization, short interest ratios, and the standard deviation of residuals from a market model regression for the prior one hundred trading days. They report that the underperformance of stocks with a high short interest ratio is concentrated among smaller stocks with a higher residual standard deviation.
Other work focuses on why stocks are shorted and explores the costs of short selling. that are "on special," where short sellers must pay a premium to borrow shares. They find that these stocks are more likely to have high short interest ratios. Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2003) find that stocks which are difficult to short are more likely to violate put-call parity.
While these last four papers have detailed data on rebate rates and study the costs of short selling in depth, none of them examine short selling and stock returns for NYSE-Amex and Nasdaq stocks for as long a time period as our paper does. month. The markets and the financial press report both the current and past month short interest together. The short interest data are frequently revised the following month. These revisions occur primarily because a member firm is tardy in reporting, and its short interest is not included in the initial amount reported. Most revisions are quite small and where the revised numbers are provided, we use the revised numbers.
III. Data and Research Design
The short interest data in this paper are from five sources. The first two sources are the NYSE and Amex, which began selling their monthly short interest data to the public in January 1991. The third source is Nasdaq, which began supplying data in electronic form on a monthly basis in June 1988, although February and July 1990 are missing. Nasdaq monthly short interest data for months starting in January 1994 is available on the Nasdaq website. The last two sources 2 One problem with using newspapers as a source of data is that they limit their coverage of short interest positions to firms with the largest number of shares sold short or firms with large changes in short interest. The cut-off criteria also changes over time. For example, the August 2000 Wall Street Journal reports short sales for NYSE and Amex firms with positions greater than 850,000 shares or whose short positions changed by more than 525,000 shares since the last month. The Nasdaq numbers for August 2000 are 575,000 and 350,000 respectively. In August 1995, the short sale cut-offs for NYSE-Amex firms are 300,000 and 50,000. In general, the reporting requirements have increased, reflecting stock splits and the general increase in short sales. To assist in comparing short positions across time and firms, we adjust short interest in two ways. First, the exchange reported short sales are not always adjusted for stock splits or stock dividends that occur the same month, so we matched all firms with the CRSP tapes and corrected for these events. Adjusting for stock splits is cumbersome because the effective date of the stock split during a month may be before or after the short interest numbers are reported.
Second, as mentioned, we divide each firm's short interest by the number of shares outstanding.
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This adjustment is important when comparing firms because the number of shares that constitute a significant short interest position differs from firm to firm depending on the shares outstanding.
All short interest numbers in this paper are reported as percentages of total shares outstanding. The dip in the late 1990s corresponds to a period of rapidly rising stock prices. This reduction in the mean short interest ratios as the bubble inflated suggests that "limits to arbitrage" arguments are important (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) reports the correlations between short interest and the prior six month and prior one month market returns. These correlations are also negative, but the correlation between the prior month market return and short interest is smaller than that between the twelve month market return and short interest.
Because the upward trend in mean short interest ratios suggests that the series may be nonstationary, in Panel B of Table 2 we report the correlation between the change in the percentage of the market sold short and the lagged market return. While these correlations are still negative (with one exception), they reverse the pattern in Panel A. The correlations between market return and change in short interest is larger for one month prior returns than for twelve month prior returns. These results are not surprising since an upward movement in the market raises the costs of many short sellers as they must pay cost of carry and meet margin calls.
To illustrate the types of firms with high short interest, Table 3 billion. In other words, almost all of these are small cap stocks, but not micro-cap. Almost all of these stocks were in the Russell 2000 index representing the firms with market caps ranking them 1,001 to 3,000 among the roughly 5,000 domestic operating companies on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq. Furthermore, the industry representation is fairly broad-this portfolio of firms does not subject the holder to excessive concentration in one industry. The combined market cap of these 54 stocks was approximately $35 billion, only a little more than 10% of that of General Electric or Microsoft. Table 3 also lists the prior 12-month buy and hold return for the 54 stocks with high short interest, and their market-to-book ratios. Inspection of the list shows that most of the stocks have had negative returns in the prior year, although a few have had big run-ups. As measured by market-to-book ratios, there is a combination of growth and value stocks, with Nasdaq stocks tending to be growth stocks and NYSE-Amex stocks tending to be value stocks.
C. Research Design
To empirically investigate whether high short interest stocks underperform relative to the market, we study the relation between short interest and subsequent returns. We form portfolios of highly shorted firms and then calculate returns on these portfolios, reasoning that the strongest relation between short interest and excess returns should exist for firms that have the largest short positions. Following Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) and Desai et al (2002) , we construct three different absolute short interest samples. These samples have short interest greater than or equal to 2.5%, 5%, or 10% of shares outstanding.
Monthly portfolio returns are calculated from the monthly CRSP tapes, where all returns are from holding long positions. Thus, a negative return is good for short sellers since the stocks sold short decreased in price. This return does not include the higher costs of short selling. That is, it does not include the costs to borrow, the risk of demand loans, and transaction costs associated with heavy portfolio turnover.
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Since short interest information is collected and released in the middle of calendar month 0, we form portfolios at the end of month 0 and report returns beginning in event month 1. 8 The return for the portfolio over inclusion period [1,T] is the one-month return for a portfolio of highly shorted firms whose short interest data is released in month 0, where the firms stay in the portfolio through month T. Alternatively stated, a stock is in the portfolio [1,T] if it qualified for inclusion in one or more of the previous T months. Thus, the monthly portfolio return over inclusion period [1, 1] is the return for the calendar month after the firms' short interest places them into a highly shorted portfolio. 9 All of the returns reported in this paper are monthly portfolio returns.
Firms often remain highly shorted for several consecutive months. Table 4 reports the length of time that firms remain in a high short interest portfolio once they have entered it. Table   7 D'Avolio (2002) reports that firms with high short interest ratios are more likely to be on special than other stocks. For these stocks the short interest ratio is likely to be lower than it would be if the supply of shares available for lending was not limited. See the Appendix for institutional procedures on short selling. 8 The short interest data is from three to five business days before the fifteenth of the month. The release of the information is one or two weeks later. Thus the return in month 0 includes the period prior to the reporting date, as well as a period when the short interest data are not yet known to investors. 9 The portfolio return for inclusion period [1,1] also contains some information from new short interest data released that month. For example, the [1,1] return for August 1992 (where the portfolio is formed of firms identified by the release of short interest data on July 27 th ) will include the market reaction to short interest data that was released on August 21
st for the NYSE-Amex and August 26 th for Nasdaq.
4 shows that some stocks have high short interest for only one or a few months, but others have high short interest for years. For example, about one third of the firms in a portfolio in a given month are there for only one month, but about half are in for three consecutive months or more.
Approximately 11-19% of the firms, depending on the portfolio, are in the high short interest portfolios for more than one year. This means that the portfolio for inclusion period [1,1] may include stocks that are highly shorted for the first time, as well as stocks that are highly shorted for many previous months. The last column in Table 4 shows that the median number of consecutive months a firm is highly shorted is 2-3 months. Therefore, the longer the inclusion period, the greater is the number of months a firm is included in the portfolio when it is no longer highly shorted. Finally, Table 4 shows that approximately 70% of firms are highly shorted for more than one consecutive month.
IV. Empirical Results

A. Portfolio Returns
We report returns from July 1988 to December 2002 on the entire sample of NYSEAmex-Nasdaq firms, and after categorizing firms by whether they are traded on the NYSE-Amex or Nasdaq, we also report returns on NYSE-Amex firms from February 1976 to December 2002.
In Panel A, we report portfolio returns for firms with short interest ratios of at least 2.5%, and in Panel B, we report portfolio returns for firms whose short interest ratio places them in the 99 th percentile. 10 Table 5 The abnormal returns are estimated from the four-factor regression model: r pt -r ft = a + b(r mt -r ft ) + sSMB t + hHML t + mMOM t + e pt where r pt -r ft is the excess return over the risk-free rate on a portfolio in time period t, r mt -r ft is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB t is the return on a portfolio of Small stocks Minus the return on a portfolio of Big stocks in period t, HML t is the return on a portfolio of High book-to-market (value) Minus Low book-to-market (growth) stocks in period t, and MOM t is the return on a portfolio of prior winners minus the return on a portfolio of prior losers (Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) ). The return interval over which winners and losers are measured is the 11 months before month t-1 (i. with short interest ratios of at least 2.5% are positive for every inclusion period and for every calendar period. These positive raw returns imply that a trading strategy of being naked short in highly shorted firms is unprofitable. This alone does not indicate that highly shorted stocks are not overvalued. The abnormal returns, measured using a four-factor model, are negative for the majority of EW portfolios reported in columns 4-6. This shows that these firms, even though they have a positive raw return, underperform.
In Panel B of Table 5, In Table 5 , for every reported calendar time period, the abnormal returns are more negative for portfolio inclusion period [1,1] than [1,6] which in turn is more negative than [1, 12] .
The fact that the monthly four-factor intercept shows lower returns for inclusion period [1, 1] than either [1, 6] or [1, 12] suggests that high portfolio turnover may be required to capture the low returns on stocks with high short interest ratios.
In the rest of the paper, we will only report results from the four-factor model and we will only report returns from two inclusion periods: anywhere from -48 basis points to -125 basis points per month. On an annualized basis, this is 6% to 15% per year. The more heavily shorted are the firms in a portfolio, the more negative is the performance: the portfolio where all firms have short interest ratios of at least 10% has more underperformance than the 5.0% portfolio, which in turn does worse than the 2.5% portfolio.
Similarly, the 99 th percentile portfolio has more extreme underperformance than the 95 th percentile portfolio.
The abnormal returns on the portfolios in Table 6 Panel A are not independent because some firms appear in more than one portfolio. For example, the 2.5% portfolio includes all stocks with a short interest ratio of 2.5% or higher, including those with a short interest ratio of 5.0% or more. In principle, firms with short interest ratios between 2.5% and 4.9% could have zero abnormal returns and yet the 2.5% portfolio, as measured, could significantly underperform.
To look at the marginal effects, we examine in Panel B three additional truncated portfolios:
portfolios containing firms with a short interest ratio greater than or equal to 2.5% but less than 5%, greater than or equal to 5% but less than 10%, and greater than or equal to the 95 th percentile but less than the 99 th percentile. While the greater than 2.5% portfolio in Panel A has an intercept of -48 basis points and a t-statistic of -2.79, the 2. Examination of the factor loadings (the slope coefficients) in Table 6 Panels A-D reveals that firms with high short interest tend to have relatively high systematic risk, tend to positively covary with small firms, tend to be tilted towards growth stocks when value weighted portfolios are used, and tend to have negative momentum. Table 7 compares median size and market-tobook ratios of highly shorted stocks to the rest of the market. We now substitute the truncated portfolios, 2.5-4.9%, 5-9.9%, and 95-98.9 th percentile for the untruncated portfolios greater than 2.5%, greater than 5%, and 95 th percentile in the tables. This is so each of our three absolute cutoff portfolios and two relative portfolios are distinct and there is no overlap of firms within the absolute or relative rankings. The median market cap of highly shorted firms in Panel A is noticeably higher than the median for other firms, reflecting the paucity of micro-cap stocks in our portfolios. This is consistent with 12 Boehme et al report four-factor regression intercepts for equally weighted portfolios of firms with high short interest ratios. Their large firm portfolio has approximately 1,500 stocks in it during the portion of their sample period, 1993-July 1999, in which Nasdaq stocks are included. The poor performance of mid-cap stocks offsets the relatively good performance of large-cap stocks, and thus they fail to pick up the relatively high returns on large stocks with high short interest ratios that our VW portfolios uncover.
In In constructing the NYSE-Amex portfolios and Nasdaq portfolios using the 95-98.9 th and 99 th percentiles, we use population-specific short interest ratio cutoffs, whereas when we report combined NYSE-Amex-Nasdaq results, as in Table 6 , the same absolute cutoffs are used for all stocks in a given month. For example, as shown in Figures 1 and 2 , in December 2002 the 99 th percentile cutoff for NYSE-Amex firms is about 23%, but for Nasdaq firms, it is about 21%.
These are the cutoffs that we use in Table 8 , but the Table 6 cutoff would be about 22%, applied to all firms.
In Panel A of Tables 5 and 6 , this underperformance is more extreme, the more heavily shorted the firms in the portfolio.
In Panel B, we report the results of four-factor regressions for EW portfolios of Nasdaq stocks with high short interest. In contrast to the NYSE-Amex results, the underperformance for Nasdaq stocks is not always statistically significant at conventional levels. Only two of the five intercepts are significant at the 10% level, although all of the point estimates are negative, ranging from -14 to -127 basis points per month. The Nasdaq results also do not follow a monotonic pattern, since the 5-9.9% truncated portfolio has a more negative intercept than the 10% portfolio.
While the systematic risk in both panels is high and the momentum factors are both negative, some of the factor loadings differ substantially between the Panel A NYSE-Amex results and the Panel B Nasdaq results. Specifically, the EW Nasdaq portfolios are more sensitive to small stock movements, and the NYSE-Amex portfolios move with value stocks, whereas the Nasdaq portfolios move with growth stocks. The reliably positive coefficients on HML for NYSE-Amex stocks are somewhat surprising, given that our Table 7 and Dechow et al (2001) report that NYSE-Amex firms with high short interest tend to be growth firms.
13 13 The difference in conclusions about whether highly shorted NYSE-Amex firms tend to be growth firms (the conclusion based on the medians) or value firms (the conclusion based on the slope coefficients) has to do with differences in the weighting schemes. The Fama-French HML factor is constructed by giving equal weights to the In Panels C and D of (1976 -June 1988 , July 1988 -1994 , and 1995 and two combined periods (1976 ( and July 1988 presented in Table 9 . The earliest subperiod is only available for NYSE-Amex stocks. We will first discuss the EW and VW subperiod results by panel and then the combined period results.
The NYSE-Amex-Nasdaq results reported in Panel A show statistically significant negative EW intercepts for the 2.5-4.9% and 99 th percentile portfolios during the July 1988-1994
subperiod. The VW results for the same subperiod are significantly negative only for the 99 th returns on a value weighted portfolio of small value firms and a value weighted portfolio of large value firms, and then subtracting the returns on two growth stock portfolios that are weighted in a similar manner. The effect of this (which is done to minimize the correlation of the HML factor with the size factor) is to overweight the influence of small growth stocks on Nasdaq. Consequently, since NYSE-Amex stocks are tilted towards value relative to Nasdaq stocks, even growth stocks on the NYSE-Amex appear to have a value tilt with respect to the HML factor.
percentile and the 10% (not reported in the These results show that during the subperiod July 1988-1994 both NYSE-Amex and Nasdaq EW portfolios exhibited significantly negative abnormal returns for all but the least restrictive NYSE-Amex portfolios. In addition, for this subperiod the most highly shorted VW portfolios are also negative and significant for both NYSE-Amex and Nasdaq firms. This is by far the most universally negative subperiod we examine and is of course the time period that Tables 8 and 9 . The 48 month VW rolling regressions, not shown here, have less negative and significant intercepts than the EW rolling regressions, as expected from Tables 8 and 9 . It should be noted that the rolling intercepts are not independent, i.e. for each month, each 48 month portfolio contains 47 of the same observations as the portfolio before and after it.
In summary, Table 8 shows that EW high short interest portfolios underperform the market for both combined markets and for NYSE-Amex and Nasdaq separately. However, Table   9 and Figures 3 and 4 show that this result does not hold for all calendar periods. Most 14 In unreported results, our untruncated EW Nasdaq 2.5% portfolio has a negative abnormal return of -103 basis points. Our stronger results may be due to extensive data cleaning which would reduce any errors in variables bias. In addition, our empirical results consistently have larger standard errors than in Desai et al (2002) , even when we use untruncated portfolios and methodology that is identical to their Table 3 methodology. Our t-statistic implies a monthly standard error of 31 basis points, whereas their t-statistic implies a monthly standard error of 23 basis points. On pp. 2275 and 2277 they report the point estimates and t-statistics from additional robustness checks, with implied standard errors of an implausibly low 3-6 basis points per month. The t-statistics on their robustness checks are apparently overstated by a factor of almost ten.
importantly, the June 1988-1994 period is among the strongest period of underperformance, particularly for the Nasdaq stocks that Desai et al (2002) analyze.
C. Abnormal portfolio returns for inclusion period [1,12]
In Tables 6, 8 , and 9 firms with high short interest enter a portfolio in the calendar month immediately after they meet the inclusion criteria, and are removed from the portfolio in the month after their short interest ratio falls below the portfolio's threshold. We next calculate returns for inclusion period [1, 12] where firms stay in a portfolio until 11 months have elapsed after their short interest ratio drops below the threshold (e.g., a 2.5% short interest ratio for the 2.5% portfolio). If, within 10 months after falling below the inclusion threshold, a stock's short interest ratio rises to qualify it for inclusion again, its time in the portfolio is extended. In other words, for calendar month t, the firms in a high short interest portfolio are all firms whose short interest ratio qualified it for inclusion in at least one month during the prior 12 months. If a firm is delisted, it is no longer part of the portfolio. The purpose of using this longer portfolio inclusion period is to see if abnormal performance persists. Unless there is an early delisting, all stocks in the portfolio are retained in the portfolio for at least one year, as contrasted with the one-month minimum in Tables 6, 8 , and 9.
The pattern of intercepts from the four-factor regressions using monthly returns for inclusion period [1,12], although not reported here, are similar, but not as strong as in Table 9 . 
V. Arbitrage vs. Valuation Shorts
A stock can have a high short interest ratio for several reasons. Thus far we have assumed that stocks have high short interest because investors considered them to be overvalued. We refer to these as valuation shorts. But many short positions are established as part of an arbitrage strategy, with convertible bond arbitrage and takeover arbitrage among the most common motivations. In a typical convertible bond arbitrage, an investor views the conversion option on the convertible to be underpriced, and buys the convertible while simultaneously shorting the stock. The position is unwound when the convertible price rises so that the conversion option is no longer underpriced, a process that might take many months. In a typical takeover arbitrage, the investor shorts the acquiring firm and goes long in the takeover target if the takeover is a stock-for-stock exchange. In cash-for-stock takeovers, risk arbitrageurs typically just take an unhedged long position in the target. Because few takeovers drag on for long periods, takeover arbitrage frequently involves positions held for at most a few months before being unwound.
Of course, a firm might have a high short interest ratio because there is both valuation shorting and arbitrage shorting taking place simultaneously. Unfortunately, we cannot identify these situations precisely. To simplify things, we categorize firms that either have a convertible bond outstanding or are making an acquisition as arbitrage shorts. As a crude measure we take all firms with convertible bonds outstanding from Compustat balance sheet information and consider them arbitrage shorts. Panel A of Table 10 shows that firms with convertible bonds outstanding are much more likely to have high short interest ratios than random firms. Over the 1988-2002 period, 9.6% of all firms in a given month had a convertible bond outstanding. In the 99 th percentile portfolio, 25.7% of firms had a convertible bond outstanding for an average month. Thus, stocks with convertible bonds are roughly three times as likely to be in high short interest portfolios as random stocks. This finding supports our assumption that this crude measure may identify arbitrage shorting.
Categorizing our sample as either arbitrage or valuation shorts and re-estimating the EW four-factor portfolio model over the period 1988-2002 yields the results in Panels B, C, and D of Table 10 . 15 The pattern of four-factor model intercepts for EW portfolios of stocks with high short interest (using the 2.5-4.9% and 99 th percentile portfolios) shows that abnormal returns on arbitrage shorts are less negative and less statistically significant than valuation shorts. Thus, Table 10 suggests that the negative abnormal returns on our high short interest portfolios are driven more by valuation shorts than by arbitrage shorts. Moreover, Panel A clearly shows, even though our methodology does not allow us to identify when arbitrage shorting takes place, there is more than one reason for shorting stocks.
VI. Conclusion and Implications
In recent years the empirical literature on short selling shows that stocks with high short interest ratios underperform and that short interest ratios have increased over time (Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) and Desai et al (2002) ). This literature also documents that short sellers target firms selling at high multiples (Dechow et al (2001)), that the stocks with the worst subsequent performance are those with both high short interest and large differences of opinion (Boehme et al (2002)), and that there is a large negative correlation between market performance and short interest (Lamont and Stein (2004) ).
The problem with this literature is that it is based on short time periods and/or incorrect and incomplete analysis. In this paper, we show that while equally weighted portfolios of stocks with high short interest ratios reliably underperformed over the 1976-2002 period, value weighted portfolios did not. In addition, by using truncated (non-overlapping) portfolios, we
show that the highest short interest stocks drive some of the results of earlier work. Moreover, we show that 2002 has the highest levels of short interest ever recorded. While there is a negative correlation between short interest and trailing market performance for our whole period, it is weak compared to the 1995-2002 period that Lamont and Stein examine. Furthermore, the correlation between changes in short interest and trailing market performance, not reported elsewhere, is large and significant for the one month prior market return.
We find that the underperformance of high short interest firms is fairly brief, and only rapid portfolio turnover allows us to realize this underperformance. We also examine whether high short interest is based only on valuation concerns and find that convertible bond arbitrage is a major reason for high short interest as well. Finally, we show that the performance of high short interest NYSE-Amex stocks is more severe and consistent than for their Nasdaq counterparts over the period July 1988 July -2002 , and that small cap firms make up a large portion of the firms that are highly shorted.
Equally weighted portfolios of heavily shorted stocks underperform relative to a fourfactor model specification during the 1976 and July 1988 period. A portfolio strategy of shorting these stocks should therefore yield positive abnormal returns over this period.
Whether short sellers in fact can profit from this strategy depends on implementation costs, including some unique to short selling. First, short sellers must locate the stock to borrow, which can sometimes be difficult. Second, even after locating the stock, they must stand ready to repay the loan at any time. Hence, short sellers face the risk that their positions may be terminated at a less than optimal time. Most importantly, as other studies show (D'Avolio (2002), Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002), and Jones and Lamont (2002)), many of the stocks with high short interest are on special, which increases the cost of shorting, due to the rebate rate that must be paid. Thus, active trading strategies are likely to be subject to an implementation shortfall relative to the returns that we report.
Whether or not short sellers can profit from a short selling strategy, the finding that heavily shorted stocks underperform the market has other important investment implications. An investor selecting stocks for a portfolio should avoid stocks with a high short interest ratio. If an investor already owns a stock that develops sustained high short interest, the clear and strong advice is to sell the stock immediately, unless adverse tax consequences are present. The number of stocks in any month that must be avoided or sold is small, however. As shown in Table 6 , the abnormal return for the 99 th percentile EW portfolio is a significantly negative 125 basis points per month over the 1988-2002 period, and the abnormal return for the 95-98.9 th percentile EW portfolio is a marginally significant 36 basis points per month. Therefore, following the advice to stay away from highly shorted stocks only requires investors to avoid a few percent of all stocks in the market each month, although diligence is required to track the changing composition of these stocks.
Our findings also have implications on whether hedge funds produce positive abnormal returns. A common assertion is that one way that hedge funds add value is because of their ability to take short positions in overvalued equities, whereas most mutual funds are restricted to long-only positions. Our results indicate that the only class of stocks that reliably produce negative abnormal returns is that of small cap firms with extremely high short interest ratios. At the end of 2002, however, firms in the 99 th percentile had an aggregate market capitalization of only $35 billion. If the largest firm among these is excluded, the total market cap drops to $30 billion. If the average short interest ratio for these stocks is 40%, only $12 billion in short positions is available for these firms. Given that the hedge fund industry is estimated to have about $600 billion under management (albeit not all in domestic equities), our findings suggest that the average hedge fund is unlikely to be creating significant value from short selling stocks.
Appendix.
Short Selling Procedures
A short sale is a sale of borrowed stock, and is the most direct way for an investor to bet that a stock price will decrease. Regulatory "prudent investor rules," however, prohibit many institutional investors, particularly banks, pension funds, and insurance companies, from short selling. These rules primarily exist because the risk-return profile of a short position is very different from that of a long position. The maximum loss on a long position is the amount invested (if the security price goes to zero) while the maximum gain is unlimited. The maximum gain on a short position is 100% of the proceeds (if the security price goes to zero), but the potential loss is unlimited.
Investors selling short also face more stringent restrictions than investors going long. To execute a short sale, the seller must borrow the stock through a broker or an investor who owns the stock. The broker secures the stock either from another investor's margined account at the brokerage house, or from a large institutional investor, like a pension fund or depository bank, or from another broker-dealer. 16 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that all short sales be marked as such, and also requires that short sales on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq be made only on a "plus tick" or a "zero plus tick". That is, a short sale can only occur at a price above the last sale price or at a price equal to the last sale price if the most recent price movement was positive.
The proceeds from a short sale are not available to the short seller, but instead are escrowed as collateral for the owner of the borrowed shares. While large short sellers may receive interest on the proceeds of the short sale, small short sellers usually receive no interest. If the lenders of the stock are institutional investors, they receive the proceeds of the sale, but pay interest to the broker on these proceeds. The lending broker collects the spread between the interest rebate given to the short seller and the interest charged to stock lenders on the rebate.
These interest rates vary inversely with the difficulty in locating the borrowed shares. If the shares are not hard to borrow, the Fed Funds rate minus one-quarter percent represents a typical rebate to short sellers; Fed Funds minus one-eighth percent is a typical rate that lenders must pay. For stocks in short supply, borrowers receive no rebate, and they often pay a premium;
likewise, lenders would not pay interest and may collect rent on the proceeds of difficult to borrow stocks. When the source for the borrowed stocks is a retail margined account, not an institutional investor, the owners of the stock may never know that they have lent out the stock, and they do not receive the proceeds of the sale or any interest thereon.
In addition to the proceeds which remain as collateral, Regulation T requires that a short seller deposit 50 percent of the market value of the shorted sales as a margin requirement (the Fed Reserve sets Regulation T and the percentage may vary over time). If the price of the shorted stock rises, the short seller faces a margin call, and must deposit more funds. The short seller may use the market value of their non-margined long positions or may deposit interest-bearing treasury securities (and keep the interest) to meet margin requirements. While a short position is open, the short seller faces the additional cost of reimbursing the owner of the security for any dividends the stock may accrue. The tax treatment of short sales may also make them more costly than long positions. Unlike profits from long sales, profits from short sales are subject to short term capital gains, no matter how long the short position is held.
One distinguishing feature of the market for borrowing and lending equities that affects the risk of a short position is the term of the security's loan. All loans are "demand loans": the owner of the borrowed shares may at any time decide to sell the security, so the borrower must stand ready to replace the shares if required. If the short seller is not ready to close out their position, they will seek to borrow the shares from another source. If all available margined shares are already loaned out, and the short seller's broker cannot locate the desired shares from an institutional owner, the short seller must purchase the shares on the open market to cover the loan (this is known as a "short squeeze"). Short sellers try to manage the risk of a short squeeze by discovering the source of the borrowed shares. The broker will sometimes tell large borrowers the source of the borrowed shares, which may yield some information regarding the probability of a short squeeze. For instance, market index funds are less likely to sell their shares than retail investors or actively managed funds.
While borrowing stock to short is costly and risky, lending stock to short sellers can be safe and profitable. The combination of keeping the cash proceeds of the sale, the 50% margin requirement, and daily margin calls make the risk of lending stock very small. Any brokerage or financial intermediary may lend stock to short sellers, but the largest participants in this market are retail brokerage houses, brokerages that do large scale stock clearing operations for other firms, and banks that serve as security depositories. All three have access to large inventories of stock as a normal part of their business which they lend out to increase profitability. As short selling increased in the nineties, some investment banks began to contact fiduciaries who held large amounts of stock, i.e. pension funds, insurance companies, and university endowments to contract with them so the investment bank has access to their stock portfolios for lending purposes. The investment bank often pays a flat annual fee for access to any stock in the portfolio. This agreement does not restrict the lender's trading strategy in any way.
The costs and risks of short sales outlined above suggest that the options market would allow short sellers to establish similar positions with fewer costs and risks. Hedge fund managers and other practitioners involved in short selling maintain that they can not effectively use the options market. In interviews, they repeatedly claimed that the options market provides less liquidity and is more expensive than the short sales market when trying to establish a large position. Few investors, they assert, are willing to write large amounts of puts on an individual stock without hedging themselves. An important part of the hedge when writing a put is to short the stock. Attempts to buy puts on a hard-to-borrow stock therefore drive up the demand for loans of the stock, and thereby increase the price of the option. Table 4 Descriptive Statistics Columns 1-3 report monthly arithmetic average percentage raw returns for firms with high short interest in month 0 during periods of, respectively, 1 month, 6 months, and 12 months starting at the beginning of the following calendar month. Each portfolio from a calendar month during a sample period is weighted equally. Columns 4-6 report intercepts from four-factor regressions using monthly percentage returns, as described in Table 6 , where a firm is included in the portfolio for calendar month t if it qualified for inclusion in the portfolio in at least one month during, respectively, month t-1, months t-6 to t-1, or months t-12 to t-1. For Nasdaq firms, we include only stocks listed on the National Market System (NMS). An intercept of 0.08 means 8 basis points per month. In the time series regressions using monthly returns, the dependent variable is r pt -r ft , the excess return over the riskfree rate on a portfolio in time period t, r mt -r ft is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB t is the return on a portfolio of Small stocks Minus the return on a portfolio of Big stocks in period t, HML t is the return on a portfolio of High book-to-market (value) Minus Low book-to-market (growth) stocks in period t, and MOM t is the return on a portfolio of prior winners minus the return on a portfolio of prior losers. The monthly factor return realizations are provided by Kenneth French. For July 1988-December 2002, 174 monthly returns are used in the regressions. The 2.5% portfolio in month t is the portfolio composed of all Amex, NYSE, and Nasdaq National Market System stocks with a short interest ratio of greater than 2.5% (short interest/shares outstanding) in month t-1. The portfolio is updated monthly. Panel A reports the size (market capitalization) for firms in the respective short interest portfolios, and for firms whose short interest ratio is lower than required for inclusion. For firms with a missing size value in year t, the year t-1 size value is used. Size is calculated by taking the year end market price times the shares outstanding at year end. Panel B reports the median market-to-book ratio of equity for firms in the respective short interest portfolios, and for firms whose short interest ratio is lower than required for inclusion. For firms with a missing book value in year t, the year t-1 book value is used. Book values are from Compustat. Nasdaq firms include only National Market System (NMS) listings. In the time series regressions using monthly percentage returns, the dependent variable is r pt -r ft , the excess return over the risk-free rate on a portfolio in time period t, r mt -r ft is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB t is the return on a portfolio of Small stocks Minus the return on a portfolio of Big stocks in period t, HML t is the return on a portfolio of High book-to-market (value) Minus Low book-to-market (growth) stocks in period t, and MOM t is the return on a portfolio of prior winners minus the return on a portfolio of prior losers. For July 1988-December 2002, 174 observations are used in the regressions. The 2.5% portfolio is the portfolio composed of all Nasdaq stocks with a short interest ratio of greater than 2.5% (short interest/shares outstanding) in month t-1. The portfolio is updated monthly. The 5.0% and 10.0% portfolios are defined analogously. The 95 th percentile portfolio is composed of all stocks that are in the top five percent of short interest ratios in month t-1. Intercepts and their t-statistics from monthly time series regressions of r pt -r ft , the percentage excess return over the risk-free rate on a portfolio in time period t, regressed on r mt -r ft is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB t is the return on a portfolio of Small stocks Minus the return on a portfolio of Big stocks in period t, HML t is the return on a portfolio of High book-to-market (value) Minus Low book-to-market (growth) stocks in period t, and MOM t is the return on a portfolio of prior winners minus the return on a portfolio of prior losers, are reported. For July 1988-December 1994, 78 monthly returns are used in the regressions. For January 1995 to December 2002, 96 monthly returns are used. The 2.5% portfolio in month t is the portfolio composed of all Nasdaq stocks in with a short interest ratio of greater than 2.5% (short interest/shares outstanding) in month t-1. The portfolio is updated monthly. Arbitrage shorts are firms with high short interest that have a convertible bond outstanding. Valuation shorts are all other firms with high short interest. Intercepts and their t-statistics from time series regressions using monthly percentage returns of r pt -r ft , the excess return over the risk-free rate on a portfolio in time period t, regressed on r mt -r ft is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB t is the return on a portfolio of Small stocks Minus the return on a portfolio of Big stocks in period t, HML t is the return on a portfolio of High book-to-market (value) Minus Low book-to-market (growth) stocks in period t, and MOM t is the return on a portfolio of prior winners minus the return on a portfolio of prior losers, are reported. For July 1988-December 2002, 174 monthly returns are used. The 2.5% portfolio in month t is the portfolio composed of all Nasdaq stocks in with a short interest ratio of greater than 2.5% (short interest/shares outstanding) in month t-1. The portfolio is updated monthly. The 99 th percentile portfolio in month t is composed of all stocks that are in the top one percent of short interest ratios in month t-1. Panel 
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Figure 4-Intercepts (and 5% and 95% confidence bands) from rolling 48-month four-factor regression with the market excess return, book-to-market, size, and momentum as the four factors. For month t, the regression is estimated over the 48 months from month t-48 to t. The vertical axis measures the intercept in units of monthly returns, with an alpha of -0.01 corresponding to -1.0 percent per month.
